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U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n.,  




The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the United 
States Forest Service and Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, a company who 
planned to construct a natural gas pipeline under a section of the 
Appalachian National Scenic Trail within the George Washington 
National Forest. The legal battle sought to clarify whether the United 
States Forest Service had the authority to grant the pipeline builder a right-
of-way across the Appalachian Trail. The Court ruled that the National 
Park Service holds an easement for administering the Appalachian Trail, 
but the land over which the trail crosses remains under the jurisdiction of 
the Forest Service. Therefore, under the Mineral Leasing Act, the Forest 
Service had the authority to grant Atlantic Coast Pipeline a pipeline right-




Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (“Atlantic”) cleared a major legal 
challenge to the construction of a 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West 
Virginia to North Carolina.1 The legal challenge centered on a 0.1-mile 
section of pipeline that would traverse 600 feet under the Appalachian 
National Scenic Trail (“AT”) as part of a sixteen mile section crossing the 
George Washington National Forest.2 Atlantic obtained permits from the 
United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”), including a  right-of-way 
for the 0.1-mile AT segment.3 The issue in the case was whether the Forest 
Service had the authority to grant the right-of-way for the section of 
pipeline that crossed the AT.4 Under the Mineral Leasing Act (“Leasing 
Act”), federal agencies can grant pipeline rights-of-way on all federal 
lands except for national park land.5 The National Park Service (“Park 
Service”), not the Forest Service, administers the AT, a national scenic 
trail in the National Trail System.6 The Court held that even though the 
Park Service administers the AT, the land over which the trail passes is 
not part of the National Park System. Therefore, the Forest Service had the 
authority, under the Leasing Act, to grant Atlantic its right-of-way.7  
Shortly after this decision, Atlantic decided to cancel construction 
of the pipeline, citing legal uncertainties facing the project as well as its 
 
1.  U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n., 140 S. Ct. 
1837, 1841 (2020). 
2.  Id. at 1841–42. 
3. Id. at 1842. 
4.  Id. at 1843–44. 
5.  Id. at 1843. 
6.  Id. at 1841. 
7. Id. 
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ballooning costs from lawsuits.8 Lawsuits reportedly increased the cost of 
the pipeline from $4.5 billion to $8 billion.9  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Passed in 1920, the Leasing Act gave the Secretary of the Interior 
the power to grant pipeline rights-of-way through public lands.10 This Act 
was further amended in 1973 to allow other agency heads the same 
power.11 The 1973 amendments defined “public lands” as “all lands owned 
by the United States, except lands in the National Park System, lands held 
in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe, and lands on the Outer Continental 
Shelf.”12 Congress had previously defined the National Parks System in 
1970 as “any area of land and water now and hereafter administered by the 
Secretary of Interior, through the National Park Service for park, 
monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”13 This 
carve-out means that companies cannot rely on the Leasing Act for a right-
of-way for a potential pipeline crossing national park land.14 
Enacted in 1968, the National Trails Systems Act (“Trails Act”) 
established a system of national scenic and historic trails.15 The Trails Act 
gives administrative responsibilities for the AT to the Secretary of the 
Interior, who delegated these responsibilities to the National Park 
Service.16 In 2015, Atlantic began the permitting process for a 604-mile 
natural gas pipeline that would run from West Virginia to North 
Carolina.17 This proposed route included a sixteen-mile segment through 
the George Washington National Forest with a 0.1-mile section crossing 
under the AT. Because the pipeline crossed national forest land, Atlantic 
needed specific use permits from the Forest Service as well as a right-of-
way for the 0.1-mile AT segment.18 The Forest Service granted these  
permits in 2018.19 Cowpasture River Preservation Association, 
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network, 
Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia 
(“Respondents”) filed a petition for review, after exhausting all 
administrative appeals, in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
 
8.   Ivan Penn, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Canceled as Delays and Costs 
Mount, NEW YORK TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/ 
business/atlantic-coast-pipeline-cancel-dominion-energy-berkshire-hathaway.html. 
9. Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline, DOMINION ENERGY (July 5, 2020), https://news.dominionenergy.com/2020-
07-05-Dominion-Energy-and-Duke-Energy-Cancel-the-Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline. 
10. Cowpasture River Preservation Assn., 140 S. Ct. at 1843. 
11.  Id.  
12. Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2018)). 
13. Id. (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2018)). 
14. Id. at 1853. 
15. Id.  at 1843 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a) (2018)). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1841. 
18. Id. at 1842.  
19. Id. 
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Fourth Circuit. The Respondents contended that the pipeline right-of-way 
granted to Atlantic to cross under the AT was a violation of the Leasing 
Act.20 Atlantic intervened.21  
The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of Respondents, holding that the 
Forest Service did not have the statutory authority to grant pipeline rights-
of-way across the AT pursuant to the Leasing Act.22 The court found that 
the AT was a part of the National Park System because administrative 
duties had been delegated to the National Park Service.23 Therefore, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that because the AT was part of the National 
Park System, it was “beyond the authority of ‘the Secretary of the Interior 
or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights-of-way.”24 The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the Forest Service 





The Court analyzed multiple interacting federal laws including the 
Leasing Act and the National Trails Systems Act, and issues pertaining to 
federalism and private property rights. 
 
A. National Trails as Easements  
 
The Forest Service and the Park Service entered into a right-of-
way agreement for the 780 miles of the AT that traverses national forest 
land in 1971.26 Respondents argued that this right-of-way agreement 
converted the federal land beneath the AT into National Park System land, 
and under the Leasing Act, a pipeline cannot cross federal land within the 
National Park System without congressional authorization.27 The Court 
rejected this argument by relying on basic property law principles and 
legislative history.28 Citing contemporary cases and definitions, the Court 
defined a right-of-way as a type of easement granting a limited “‘right to 
pass . . . through the estate of another.’”29  
Around the time the Trails Act was enacted, courts acknowledged 
that rights-of-way only gave nonpossessory rights, and that the grantor of 
 
20. Id. 
21.  Id.  
22. Id. 
23. Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018)). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 1841. 
26. Id. at 1844. 
27. Id. at 1848. 
28. Id. at 1845–46. 
29. Id. at 1844 (quoting Right-of-way, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 
(4th ed. 1968)). 
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the right-of-way retained full ownership of “the land itself.”30 The Court 
opined that if a private land owner granted a right-of-way to a private 
company for a pipeline, “no one would think” the company now owned 
the land.31 Relying on this logic and the absence of contrary language in 
the Trails Act, the Court reasoned that Congress would not attach two 
different meanings to the “‘same term in the same statute’” and grant a 
more expansive meaning for federal agencies.32 Based on these 
definitions, the Court applied a basic principle of property law: “easements 
are not land, they merely burden land that continues to be owned by 
another.”33  
The Court held that the Park Service holds an easement for the 
purpose of creating and administering the AT, but “the land itself remains 
under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.”34 This means that the AT falls 
outside the 1970 definition of National Park System land.35 Therefore, the 
AT was national forest land, not national park land, and the Forest Service 
could grant Atlantic’s pipeline right-of-way under the Leasing Act.36  
 
B. Congressional Intent and Private Property Concerns 
 
To determine whether the AT was part of the National Park 
System, the Court examined similar legislation to the Trails Act to further 
understand and apply Congress’s intent. These other statutes, when 
intending to transfer land between agencies, used “unequivocal and direct 
language” to do so.37 The Court compared the language in the Trails Act 
to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act38—enacted the same day as the Trails 
Act.39 When drafting Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Congress explicitly said 
“any component of the national wild and scenic rivers system that is 
administered by the Secretary of Interior through the National Park 
Service shall become a part of the National Park System.”40 The Court 
reasoned that if Congress intended for the land the AT crosses to become 
part of the National Park System, the Trails Act would have used similarly 
explicit language.41 Instead, Congress used terms of rights-of-ways, 
implying it did not intend for a land transfer for national trails.42  
 
30. Id. at 1844 (citing Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d 
786, 789 (Minn. 1970)). 
31. Id. at 1847. 
32. Id. (quoting Azar v. Allina Health Services, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 
(2019)).  
33. Id. at 1845. 
34. Id. at 1846.  
35. Id. at 1848. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1847. 
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2018). 
39. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n., 140 S. Ct. at 1847. 
40. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1281(c)).  
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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The Court also warned that finding for the Respondents would 
entail a massive expansion of power to the Department of Interior (“DOI”) 
without express consent from Congress.43 The AT encompasses 58,110.94 
acres of non-federal land including 8,815.98 acres of private land.44 Under 
Respondents’ argument, the DOI could expand the Park Service’s 
jurisdiction by delegating administrative responsibilities to the Park 
Service.45 According to the Court, this would mean that all trails 
administered by the Park Service, or other lands delegated for 
administrative purposes, would be part of the National Park System.46 The 
Court expressed concern for both issues in federalism and private property 
rights resulting from such an expansion in Park Service jurisdiction.47 
Under Respondents’ argument, the Court opined that all of this non-federal 
and private land would also fall under the jurisdiction of the Park 
Service.48 The Court, citing its own precedent, stated that “when Congress 
wishes to ‘alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,’ . . . we 
would expect it to speak with the requisite clarity to place that intent 
beyond dispute.”49 The Court refused to presume the delegation process 
expanded Park Service jurisdiction without “clear congressional 
command.”50  
The Court looked to the 1911 Weeks Act to support an absence of 
clear congressional command.51 The Weeks Act, which established the 
George Washington National Forest, provides that lands acquired for the 
National Forest System “shall be permanently reserved, held, and 
administered as national forest lands.”52 The Court concluded that the 
Trails Act must be read in conjunction with the Weeks Act, specifically 
pointing to the above language.53 The Court further highlighted language 
from the Trails Act that states, “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall 
be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management 
responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered 
lands which are components of the National Trails System.”54 The Court 
reasoned that these two provisions, the use of the term “right-of-way” in 
the Trails Act, and the administrative duties laid out by the Trails Act, 
further demonstrate a lack of congressional intent  for such a vast 
expansion of the Park Service’s jurisdiction.55  
 
43. Id. at 1849.  
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1848. 
46. Id. at 1849. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 
457, 468 (2001)). 
50. Id.  
51. Id. at 1842; 16 U.S.C. § 521 (2018). 
52. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n., 140 S. Ct. at 1842 (quoting 
16 U.S.C. § 521). 
53. Id. at 1850. 
54. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A) (2018)). 
55. Id.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The United States Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the 
Interior’s delegation  of overall administration of the AT did not transform 
the land over which the trail passes into part of the National Park System.56 
Therefore, under the Leasing Act, the Forest Service had the authority to 
grant Atlantic’s pipeline right-of-way.57 The Court relied heavily on its 
analysis of congressional intent as well as public policy considerations 
regarding federalism and private property rights.  
Despite this legal victory for Atlantic, the company stopped 
construction of the pipeline, citing legal uncertainties surrounding its 
future.58 However, Atlantic may sell its vast amounts of natural gas storage 
and transmission pipelines to Berkshire Hathaway Energy, who would 
also assume Atlantic’s $5.7 billion of debt, casting further doubt on the 
future of the pipeline.59 
Regardless of the future of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, the Court 
has now set a legal precedent. The twenty-one national historic and scenic 
trails that the Park Service administers are not part of the National Park 
System. Consequentially, the agencies, states, and private landowners that 
granted rights-of-way for these trails ultimately retain jurisdiction and 
ownership of those lands. For all national historic and scenic trails that are 
on federal land, the agencies who have jurisdiction over the burdened land 
now have the full authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way under the 
Mineral Leasing Act.  
 
56. Id.  
57. Id. 
58. Dominion Energy, supra note 9.  
59. Penn, supra note 8. 
